to find the problem in suggesting foreign fighters joined the Iraq war because of Abu Ghraib

In conjunction with my previous post about using America's foreign policy as a justification for terrorism, the ultimate culmination (and baselessness) of the viewpoint was illuminated in a November 2008 Washington Post article written by a former interrogator, who takes at face value foreign detainees' suggestions that they joined the fight because of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.

I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. Our policy of torture was directly and swiftly recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Think about how inane this is.  These detainees are arguing with a straight enough face to convince smart people that their sense of morality and justice was so offended by pictures of torture that they joined groups that beheaded and tortured Muslims and Americans alike, and they carried out attacks against innocent Muslim civilians.

The author of the article does not mention (or maybe never considered) that Al Qaeda in Iraq was not exactly a resistance unit.  After all, it was led by a man who was conducting terrorist operations in Jordan by 1999.  These foreign fighters who were so disgusted by pictures of nudity and stress positions joined a group who instructed followers to use torture methods like "blowtorch to the skin" and "eye removal." Oddly enough, these people who were so disturbed by pictures of torture seemed to have an affinity for drawing extremely descriptive torture methods to apply to their own detainees.

 Clearly these people are offended by the torture of Muslims


Incredibly, the author unwittingly contradicts his own argument by listing the actual reasons why these fighters were joining Al Qaeda in Iraq.  Here he attempts to explain how different interrogation techniques improved our standing in Iraq.

We no longer saw our prisoners as the stereotypical al-Qaeda evildoers we had been repeatedly briefed to expect; we saw them as Sunni Iraqis, often family men protecting themselves from Shiite militias and trying to ensure that their fellow Sunnis would still have some access to wealth and power in the new Iraq. Most surprisingly, they turned out to despise al-Qaeda in Iraq as much as they despised us, but Zarqawi and his thugs were willing to provide them with arms and money...It turns out that my team was right to think that many disgruntled Sunnis could be peeled away from Zarqawi. (emphasis mine)

So the author actually believes that the policy of torture at Abu Ghraib led these people to join Al Qaeda in Iraq, despite the fact that they "turned out to despise Al Qaeda in Iraq."  And why would these fighters who joined the fight because of Abu Ghraib turn around and start fighting WITH us against the insurgent groups?  The author never sees the holes in his logic.  Perhaps that's because the author admittedly abhors the Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo policies as being against his "moral fabric" and "inconsistent with American principles."  
In actuality, that paragraph deflates his own argument and better explains how foreign fighters actually came to join the fight. There's no real phenomenon to it.  First, most of the foreign fighters came from Middle Eastern countries like Iran and Syria that are already virulently hostile to the West and have been for decades, living in regions that inculcate anti-Americanism among its youth.  And though they comprise a very small percentage of Muslims worldwide, there are radical Muslims spread across the globe who are inherently and reflexively hostile to the West.  In addition, in lawless war zones, fighters can be bribed and bought.  After all, the Sunni Awakening itself that turned around Iraq consisted of paying Sunni tribal chiefs.  

Abu Ghraib may have been added incentive and motivation for fighters, but it's ludicrous to suggest that Abu Ghraib alone was the casus belli.